Discussion · House of Representatives
J. French Hill Republican
“I want the House to pass this bill. Right now, the biggest banks can easily outbid everyone else to buy failed banks. This bill creates a fairer process so smaller banks can compete to buy them instead of the biggest banks just getting bigger.”
“Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I join my friend from Massachusetts in speaking to the importance of this bill and provide just a couple of minutes of perspective. If you go back to the 1980s, it was a period of Third World debt crisis, the oil and gas lending crisis, and the real estate lending crisis culminating in the late 1980s with really the collapse of the savings and loan industry across the country from too lax supervision and too lax management of these institutions. In both large banks like the famous Continental Illinois failure in Chicago to some of the large thrifts, the government chose to keep banks open rather than closing them by essentially taking a note back called open bank assistance. It essentially increased the losses to the taxpayers. After the resolution of the savings and loan bank crisis and all the other related bank failures of the 1980s and very early 1990s, the government said, look, this is out of hand, and we want to enforce a least cost resolution process when a bank fails, meaning we don’t want to lose more money after the closing by trying to keep these banks open. So they offered this ability that whoever paid the highest price, thus the least cost to the taxpayers, was the winner, which is good policy. However, now it is 30 years later, and the largest banks in the country, as outlined by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lynch), have a disproportionate ability to bid $1 more and thus be the least cost to the taxpayer--or maybe after the last debate one penny more-- and be the least cost to the taxpayer. That means that it is very hard to compete with them. What the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lynch) has proposed is let us have more bidding for those failed banks by crafting a process that is transparent that Congress oversees, Congress outlines the guardrails, where smaller banks could team up with other capital sources and bid for one of those failed banks and end up being in a much more competitive process. What the government gets is a more diversified, more competitive banking system instead of the default winner being one of the big five existing financial institutions. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lynch) for his work on this legislation. I thank Chairman Barr of our Financial Institutions Subcommittee and Ranking Member Waters for bringing our bipartisan team together on the committee in advancing this bill. Mr. Speaker, I urge Members on both sides of the aisle to vote ``yes’’ on this measure. I reserve the balance of my time.”
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I join my friend from Massachusetts in speaking to the importance of this bill and provide just a couple of minutes of perspective. If you go back to the 1980s, it was a period of Third World debt crisis, the oil and gas lending crisis, and the real estate lending crisis culminating in the late 1980s with really the collapse of the savings and loan industry across the country from too lax supervision and too lax management of these institutions. In both large banks like the famous Continental Illinois failure in Chicago to some of the large thrifts, the government chose to keep banks open rather than closing them by essentially taking a note back called open bank assistance. It essentially increased the losses to the taxpayers. After the resolution of the savings and loan bank crisis and all the other related bank failures of the 1980s and very early 1990s, the government said, look, this is out of hand, and we want to enforce a least cost resolution process when a bank fails, meaning we don’t want to lose more money after the closing by trying to keep these banks open. So they offered this ability that whoever paid the highest price, thus the least cost to the taxpayers, was the winner, which is good policy. However, now it is 30 years later, and the largest banks in the country, as outlined by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lynch), have a disproportionate ability to bid $1 more and thus be the least cost to the taxpayer--or maybe after the last debate one penny more-- and be the least cost to the taxpayer. That means that it is very hard to compete with them. What the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lynch) has proposed is let us have more bidding for those failed banks by crafting a process that is transparent that Congress oversees, Congress outlines the guardrails, where smaller banks could team up with other capital sources and bid for one of those failed banks and end up being in a much more competitive process. What the government gets is a more diversified, more competitive banking system instead of the default winner being one of the big five existing financial institutions. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lynch) for his work on this legislation. I thank Chairman Barr of our Financial Institutions Subcommittee and Ranking Member Waters for bringing our bipartisan team together on the committee in advancing this bill. Mr. Speaker, I urge Members on both sides of the aisle to vote ``yes’’ on this measure. I reserve the balance of my time.